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Abstract: Using Mexican data on household time use and consumption, we ¯nd sig-
ni¯cant substitution between goods and time in home production and di®erent elasticities
of substitution for di®erent household commodities. Adding these ¯ndings to the Ramsey
optimal tax problem, we show it is optimal to impose higher taxes on market goods used
in the production of commodities with a lower elasticity of substitution between goods and
time. The reason is that government wants to minimize the distortionary substitution from
market purchases toward untaxed time use in home production. This is an analog of the
classical Corlett and Hague (1953-1954) result, di®ering in that we allow for the possibility
of substitution between goods and time in the production of commodities. Leaving aside
distributional considerations, we conclude that higher taxes should be imposed on market
goods used in the production of `Eating' and lower taxes imposed on market goods used in
the production of `Recreation'.
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Following Becker (1965), we assume that individuals combine market goods and time to produce
commodities which ultimately yield utility. For example, consider a household that wants to change
their car's engine oil. In order to get this commodity, the household needs to combine both market
goods and time. Having only the engine oil does not give any utility, it has to be put in the car's engine,
which requires time. Then we allow for the possibility of substitution between market goods and time
to produce commodities. In the case of changing the car's engine oil, one way to get the commodity
is to stop by Firestone and pay someone to do the job. This solution saves the household's time
but requires payment, including taxes, for the service. Alternatively, members of the household can
perform the maintenance themselves. This solution can save money and avoid taxation, but requires
more time, assuming the professional working at Firestone has an absolute advantage in production,
which is likely true in most cases. Take another example given by Burda et al. (2008). An American
couple has to choose between goods-intensive and time-intensive summer vacations facing a limited
budget constraint. The goods-intensive solution is to spend their time 
ying to the C^ ote d'Azur for a
one-week holiday. On the other hand, the time-intensive solution is to take a two-week caravan trip
to the Great Smoky Mountains National Park.
How do taxes on market goods aect the household's decision of how many market goods and how
much time to use in home production? These two examples show that taxes on market goods can
aect the choice of the household between goods-intensive and time-intensive solutions. Specially, an
increase in taxes on market goods encourages households to substitute away from the market goods
input in favor of the untaxed non-market time input. Therefore, if the government decides to change
the tax rate on a specic market good, the government has to take the possibility of substitution into
account.
In this paper, we rst state theoretically how taxes on market good relate to the elasticities of sub-
stitution assuming that each commodity production function has a constant elasticity of substitution
functional form, and solve the Ramsey optimal commodity tax problem for a benevolent government.
Within the framework of a three-commodity economy proposed by Corlett and Hague (1953-1954)
and the assumption of a Cobb-Douglas utility function, we nd that the optimal tax rule is to impose
a higher tax rate on market goods used in the production of commodities with a lower elasticity of
1substitution between goods and time.
Then we check how this optimal tax rule compares to what we see in reality. To this purpose,
we need to calculate the elasticities of substitution between market goods and time for dierent
commodities. We use the 2002 Mexican time use data for which we observe disaggregated market
good expenditures and time uses for the same household and for various dierent commodities. We
nd that `Eating' has the lowest elasticity of substitution and `Recreation' has the highest elasticity of
substitution. According to our theory, these results imply that `Eating' should be taxed at a very high
rate and `Recreation' at a very low rate. The optimal value added tax system for Mexico would impose
7.0% tax rate on food and 5.5% on market goods used in the production of `Lodging, Appearance, and
Recreation'. This optimal tax structure is more regressive compared to the actual Mexican tax system
in which the government gives more weight to equity considerations than to economic eciency.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section provides a theoretical model of the optimal
taxation problem. Section 3 describes our data set and summarizes key variables. The econometric
framework and estimation results are presented in section 4. Section 5 provides policy implications,
and section 6 concludes.
2 Theoretical Model
2.1 Background
Since Becker's (1965) pioneering idea of household production as a combination of goods and time, a
substantial amount of theoretical and empirical work on the household production has been done in a
variety of areas in economics (Hamermesh (2007)). However, relatively little work has been conducted
in public nance (see, e.g., Zhang et al. (2008)). The exception is the topic of optimal tax theory and
the relevant literature includes Sandmo (1990), Gahvari and Yang (1993), Kleven (2000, 2004), and
Boadway and Gahvari (2006).
Sandmo (1990) introduced the home production approach into the optimal taxation problem and
found that the income tax creates distortions, giving an incentive to use too much time in home
production. However, even though time spent preparing meals may be qualitatively dierent from
time spent listening to music, Sandmo (1990) did not deal with the possibility that dierent household
2activities can give dierent utilities. Gahvari and Yang (1993) rst related optimal commodity taxes
to the Becker's (1965) idea of home production. They assumed that households consume a bundle
of goods, each of which requires time in xed, but dierent, proportions to yield utility. Then they
found that optimal commodity tax rates depend on time spent consuming each good. Using the same
formulation as Gahvari and Yang (1993), Kleven (2004) proposed that the optimal commodity taxation
is governed by factor shares in household activities. That is, any market good which requires little time
should carry a relatively low tax rate. Boadway and Gahvari (2006) studied the optimal commodity
taxation problem under two assumptions: that consumption time is either a perfect substitute for
labor or a perfect substitute for leisure and that time spent consuming any particular good is taken
to be a xed proportion of the quantity of the good. They showed that while labor substitutability
aects the optimal tax structure, leisure substitutability leaves the classical optimal tax results intact.
Although these studies that have followed the original contribution of Gahvari and Yang (1993)
give us useful insights into what the optimal commodity tax system looks like when households com-
bine goods and time to produce commodities, they rule out the possibility of substitution between
goods purchases and time use in the production of commodity. Both studies make use of a Leontief
home production function, assuming that the amount of time devoted to the consumption of goods
is xed. Introducing a Leontief home production function has a great advantage, it simplies the
optimal commodity taxation problem by reducing it to the classical optimal commodity tax problem
without home production. Allowing the possibility of substitution between market goods and time
use complicates the problem.1
It is true that the assumption of a Leontief home production function does not completely rule
out the possibility of substitution in household production. Kleven (2004) takes dish-washing as an
example. Dish-washing may be carried out by the use of a brush or a machine and these two production
processes involve xed, but dierent ratios between market goods and time. So Kleven (2004) argues
that washing up with a brush or a machine are two dierent commodities. Even if this is true, the
problem is that the assumption of Leontief home production function requires too many commodities
since there are numerous ways to wash dishes other than using a brush and a machine. For example,





where Xj and Tj represent market goods and time
use, respectively), the optimal commodity taxation problem becomes the classical optimal tax problem without home
production, that is, U (Z0;Z1;:::;Zn) = U (X0=a0;X1=a1;X2=a2;:::;Xn=an).
3you can hire a maid. In contrast, if we explicitly allow the possibility of substitution between goods
input and time input in home production, we can think of dish-washing as a composite commodity
incorporating many dierent combinations of goods and time. So the aggregation of commodities
can reduce the number of tax rates. This reduction is important in practical point of view, since
it is impossible in real world to implement the Leontief-based optimal tax system; many dierent
commodities should be taxed at dierent rates. As Belan et al. (2008) pointed out, the grouping of
commodities should be done when there is a constraint on the number of tax rates.
Kleven (2000) provided a more general approach than Kleven (2004). Kleven (2000) showed that
the optimal tax is related to factor shares and elasticities of substitution. However, the relationship is
not clear without specic functional forms of home production, since household will optimally change
factor shares in response to the change in tax rate. The relationship between the optimal tax and
elasticities of substitution in household production varies depending on the functional forms of home
production. While Kleven (2004) circumvents this problem by assuming Leontief production function,2
we use a Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) function that has better advantages over Leontief
function.
Our contribution is to allow explicitly the possibility of substitution between goods and time in
home production by assuming a CES production function. In the theory section, we emphasize the
importance of elasticity of substitution between goods and time uses in designing optimal tax system
and derive the optimal tax rule under this possibility. The empirical analysis is based on Gronau and
Hamermesh's (2006) commodity classications and we estimate the elasticity of substitution between
market goods and time for each commodity. From an optimal tax perspective, the magnitude of
elasticity of substitution is important. So we test the hypothesis that these elasticities are equal and
derive the corresponding policy implications. This new example shows that the restrictive Leontief
assumption can be relaxed to allow for estimation of elasticities that are directly useful for policy.
2In case of Leontief production function factor shares do not change in respond to the change in tax rates. Factor
shares are determined by parameters of the Leontief production function.
42.2 Household Maximization Problem
2.2.1 Utility Maximization
Households combine market goods and time to produce commodities that directly enter their utility
function. Assume that qj = pj + sj where qj is the consumer price of market good Xj, pj is the
producer price of Xj, and sj is the tax on Xj. We also assume that w and T represent the wage
rate and total time available, respectively, and M is non-labor income.3 Then we can write the
household utility maximization problem in the following way. If there are n + 1 commodities and we




























j if j = 1:::n, and j < 1.
Z0 is pure leisure that does not need market goods, but needs time. However, other commodities Zj6=0
are produced with both goods Xj and time Tj and with specic technology having constant elasticity
of substitution between Xj and Tj.4 Let  be the elasticity of substitution between market goods and
time. So  is equal to 1
1 . Since solving this problem directly is algebraically laborious, we solve this
maximization problem in two steps. At the rst stage, the household determines the optimal amount
of goods and time input for each commodity by solving the cost minimization problem for given  Zj.
Then, in the second stage, the household makes a decision on the amount of consumption of each
commodity.
First Step Note that the price of Xj is qj (= pj + sj) and the price of Tj is w. The household cost
minimization problem is the following. Given  Zj, qj, and w,
min
Xj;Tj





















3Results do not change if we do not include non-labor income.
4CES functional form with 0  j < 1 guarantees that optimal Xj and Tj are strictly positive.
5To measure how goods and time are combined to produce a commodity let the goods intensity of
commodity j be Xj/Tj. Then equation (1) tells us how the goods intensity is related to w, q, and .






















First, an increase in the wage, w, raises the goods intensity. This suggests that the goods intensity
is increasing in household income,5 which is consistent with empirical evidence.6 Hamermesh (2007)
calculates the goods intensity of eating at various percentiles of the income distribution for 1985 and
2003 and shows that the goods intensity increases when you move to the upper end of the income
distribution.7 Second, the increase in tax sj reduces the goods intensity, but the magnitude of the
eect depends on w. The eect becomes larger as wage decreases, which means that lower-income
households are likely to be more sensitive to the tax change. Third, the goods intensity of commodity
j depends on w, qj, and j, but does not depend on taxes on other goods sj6=k.
The solution to the cost minimization problem is:
X
j = j  Zj; T





















This result looks like the assumption of Kleven (2004). However, the dierence is that coecients j
and j depend on the tax rate sj. Kleven (2004) assumes that these coecients are xed regardless
of the tax rate sj. Our result shows that when government increases the tax rate sj on good Xj,
households optimally respond by using less of the good and more time in the production of commodity
 Zj.
Second Step This step solves the utility maximization problem of the household. Given qj for
j = 1;:::;n, w, and the solution from the rst step, the problem becomes:
max
Z0;Z1;;Zn











5This is true as long as wage is a proxy for household income.
6It might be interesting to compare goods intensities across countries. We expect that the goods intensity will be
higher in countries with a higher real wage (w/q).
7See Table 5 in Hamermesh (2007).










w if j = 0
qjj + wj if j = 1;:::;n.
This relation tells us that the price of Zj is 
j which is the weighted sum of the price of good Xj,
qj, and the price of time, w. The price of Z0 is only w since it does not require market goods for its
production. From the rst order conditions, we obtain Uj = 
j for j = 0;1;:::;n:
2.3 Optimal Government Policy
Following the standard Ramsey taxation theory, the benevolent government's optimal tax problem is
to choose s1,...,sn to maximize the indirect utility of the representative household, denoted by V (),
subject to the requirement that taxes yield an exogenous amount of revenue  R. If the government
changes the tax rate on market goods, the household responds by changing both market purchases
and time use. The social planner has to consider the eect of the tax change on both goods and time
spent by the household. The government problem is:
max
s1;:::;sn
V (q1;::;qn;w) such that
n X
j=1
sjXj =  R
where qj = pj + sj for j = 1;:::;n:












A = 0 for k = 1;::;n:


































@qj is the compensated elasticity of Xk with respect to the change in the price of Xj.














kj for k =1,...,n. (4)
This Ramsey rule has the standard form of the optimal commodity tax expression which emphasizes
the importance of compensated price responses. (Diamond and Mirrlees (1971), Sandmo (1987),
Sandmo (1990)).9
Three-commodity Economy
Next, we examine a three-commodity economy rst proposed by Corlett and Hague (1953-1954), and
then used by Kleven (2004) and Boadway and Gahvari (2006). In this case, there are one untax-
able commodity (Z0) and two taxable commodities (Z1;Z2) with dierent elasticities of substitution













































12. This result suggests that if the compensated elasticity of X1 with respect
to the price of leisure is lower than the compensated elasticity of X2 with respect to the price of
leisure then a higher tax should be imposed on X1. Symbolically, "c
10 < "c
20 ! s1/q1 > s2/q2.11 This
result is the analog of standard Corlett-Hague rule: the highest tax rate ought to be levied on the
9A detailed explanation of the Ramsey rule can be found in Diamond and Mirrlees (1971, p.262) and Sandmo (1990,
p.92).
10For the detailed derivation of the property of compensated elasticity, please refer to the Appendix A.2.
11Diamond and Mirrlees (1971, p.262) prove that  is positive.  is also positive, which can be proved using the
determinant of the matrix of substitution eects (Sandmo (1987, p.93)).
8commodity with the highest degree of complementarity with leisure. This result, however, diers from
the standard Corlett-Hague rule, because of the last term on the right-hand side of each equation. In
case of the standard Corlett-Hague rule, the last term on the right-hand side of the equation is "c
10,
not 3"c
10. This dierence can be easily understood from the fact that the price of time is the same
whether the time is used for the production of Z0, Z1, or Z2.
Ramsey rule is hard to apply in practice because little is known about the magnitudes of the
compensated elasticities (Kleven (2004)). However, the elasticities of substitution can be estimated
easily if you have the necessary data. This is why we study the relationship between the compensated
elasticity and the elasticity of substitution between goods and time. To do this, we assume a specic
functional form for the utility function.12 Specically, we assume the following log utility function13:













j if j = 1;2 and 1 < 2 < 1,
and 0 + 1 + 2 = 1:
Conventional wisdom contends that the price of a necessity is lower than the price of a luxury. If this
is the case, we can show that the smaller the elasticity of substitution between goods and time, the
smaller the compensated elasticity in a three-commodity economy with the logarithmic preferences
stipulated by equation (5).14 Symbolically, 1 < 2 ! "c
10 < "c
20. Even in case that the price
of a necessity is higher than the price of a luxury, if a necessity tends to have a lower elasticity
of substitution than a luxury which is shown empirically in Section 4, the smaller the elasticity of
substitution between goods and time, the smaller the compensated elasticity. This relationship has
a quite important implication. The elasticity of substitution between goods and time is determined
by the technology of home production, but the compensated elasticity represents the market. So
12Notice that previous results do not rely on any assumption about the functional form of the utility function.
13The merit of using a logarithmic utility function is that the income and substitution eects exactly balance. If
we use another functional form, it would be hard to get meaningful results from the analysis without making further
assumptions about the income and substitution eects. In future extensions of this paper we will test whether we can
get the same result with less restrictive assumptions or other functional forms.
14For the detailed derivations, please refer to the technical Appendix A.2.
9the relationship shows us how the home production technology is related to the market response. In
response to the change in the wage rate, goods with higher elasticity of substitution between goods
and time have larger compensated elasticity.
Proposition In a three-commodity economy with logarithmic preferences, the optimal tax policy
requires that a higher tax should be placed on goods with a lower elasticity of substitution between
goods and time. Symbolically, 1 < 2 ! s1/q1 > s2/q2.
3 Data
To demonstrate the applicability of these results we use the National Time Use Survey 200215 (ENUT)
from Mexico. This is a nationally representative sample including urban and rural communities. It
surveys all individuals16 who were aged 12 years or older at the time of the survey. The total sample
includes 4,783 households and 20,342 individuals. The objective of the survey is to measure the
activities undertaken by men and women within the household.
One disadvantage of the ENUT data set is that the questionnaire is not based on time use diaries
where individuals are asked to report the activities undertaken on a given day. Instead, individuals are
only asked to report how many hours in the week were spent doing a nite number of activities listed
in the questionnaire. Hence, the total time use for each individual does not add up to 168 hours, the
total number of hours in a week. In fact, total time use averages 163.15 hours for our analysis sample.
Although it is well known that diary time use questionnaires are more detailed and more reliable
for research, the majority of time use surveys, including ENUT, instead use recall questionnaires for
major activities due to the cost and complexity of the survey design.
This disadvantage is compensated by a very important advantage. The ENUT is a sub-sample of
the National Household Survey of Income and Expenditure 200217 (ENIGH), the Mexican national
income and expenditure data set. Therefore, we can match the time use data with the expenditure data
15Encuesta Nacional del Uso del Tiempo 2002, http://www.inegi.gob.mx.
16By all individuals we mean residents and non-residents. The latter group includes personnel who help with household
activities and individuals staying there temporarily.
17Encuesta Nacional de Ingreso y Gasto de los Hogares 2002, http://www.inegi.gob.mx.
10by household. To our knowledge, only Mexican data provides information (for the same household)
on both time uses and goods expenditures for a large number of commodities, although statistical
agencies in a number of countries are moving to generate combined time use and expenditure les.
3.1 Denitions of Commodities
A household engages in numerous activities every day, for example, having breakfast and dinner, or
taking a shower and watching television. All these activities need both market goods and time as
inputs. To simplify the analysis we implicitly allocate activities into ten mutually exclusive categories,
which are called commodities. The commodities are `Sleep', `Eating', `Lodging', `Appearance', `Recre-
ation', `Health', `Child-care', `Travel', `Miscellaneous' and `Work'. Classication of time uses and
goods expenditures is not straightforward because any classication is somewhat arbitrary. In order
to be consistent with previous literature and to avoid as much subjectivity on our part, we use Gronau
and Hamermesh's (2006) denition of commodities. Tables 1 and 2 dene the time use and goods
expenditure categories, respectively. In both tables we exhaust all reported time uses and expenditures
from the data.
The classications are not exactly the same as in Gronau and Hamermesh (2006). There are three
minor variations in the time use categories due to dierences in the questionnaire structure between
their data sets and ours. In our case, time use for `Eating' includes not only eating at home and away,
meal preparation, clean-up, and grocery shopping, but also raising corral animals, collecting fruits,
hunting, shing, and taking care of the orchard. Also, in our classication, `Health' does not include
medical care at hospitals. Given the available data, `Health' only includes time spent recovering from
an illness, taking care of a family member that is temporarily ill, and personal health care. Finally,
the other dierence is in the `Travel' time use category. In our data set, this only includes time
spent accompanying a member of the family to go somewhere and taking or picking up any member
of the family to go somewhere, so it does not includes all non-working travel time. With respect to
goods expenditures categories, there are essentially no dierences between our classication and that
in Gronau and Hamermesh (2006). The only minor discrepancy is that `Lodging' includes materials
and services to repair, maintain, or extend the dwelling besides housing, a fraction of appliances
expenditures, and a fraction of communication expenditures. In both classications, `Sleep' and
11Table 1: Time Use Categoriesa
Commodity Category
Sleep Night sleep and .5(rest or recovery from an illness).
Eating Eating at home and away, meal preparation,
clean-up, grocery shopping, raising corral animals,
collecting fruits, hunting, shing, and taking care of orchard.
Lodging House cleaning, outdoor chores, home and car repairs,
gardening and animal care, durable goods shopping, misc. household duties,
and, .5(make furniture, ornament or traditional craft for the house).
Appearance Laundry and clothes care, personal and beauty care, and personal hygiene.
Recreation Sex, nonreligious organizations, entertainment, culture,
visits, social events, sports, hobbies, crafts, games, reading, writing,TV and radio,
conversing, thinking, .5(make furniture, ornament or traditional craft),
and non-travel educational activities if no children and individual is aged > 59.
Health .5(Rest or recovery from illness), taking care of a
family member that is temporarily ill, and personal health care.
Child-care All infant and child-care non-travel activities if children.
Travel Accompany any member of the family to somewhere, take or pick up
any member of the family to somewhere and travel to education-related
activities if no children.
Miscellaneous Taking care of family documents, helping other households
voluntarily, taking care of other members of the family with a physical or
mental limitation, volunteering, religious activities, making payments,
personal proceedings, taking food to another member of the family to school
or work, attending funeral services, non-travel education-related activities
if no children and individual is aged <60, and all infant and child-care
non-travel activities if no children.
Work Working at a paid job, job search time, and work commuting time.
a We exhaust all time uses reported in the ENUT 2002 into these ten mutually exclusive
categories which we called commodities. Note that `Health' does not include medical care
at hospitals. Also, `Travel' does not include all non-working travel time.





materials and services to repair, maintain or extend the house.
Appearance Apparel and services+.33(appliances)+personal care.
Recreation Entertainment+tobacco+.5(beverages)+.5(communications)+
education expenses if no children and individual is aged > 60.
Health If no children: Hospital care, doctor care, medicine
expenses without prescription.
If children: Health*(1-number of children/size of the family)
Child-care boys' and girls' apparel+ education+
Health*(number of children/size of the family) if children.
Travel Private and public transportation prorated by nonwork
travel divided by total travel time.
Miscellaneous Other expenditures and transfers+education expenses
if no children and individual is aged < 60+boys' and girls' apparel
if no children.
Work None
a We exhaust all goods expenditures reported in the ENIGH 2002 into these ten
mutually exclusive categories which we called commodities. We assume that `Sleep'
have no goods expenditures related to it. Any expenditures seemingly related to
`Sleep' were included either in `Lodging' or `Appearance' .
13`Work' are assumed to have no expenditures related to them.
3.2 Households
The unit of analysis is the household, not individuals, because in the ENIGH only household expen-
ditures are reported. In the sample we only include nuclear households (only one family within the
dwelling) to keep the sample as homogeneous as possible, because dierent types of families have
dierent time use patterns.18 For instance, we expect married couples to be more ecient in home
production than single individuals due to specialization by husband and wife in certain activities. In
fact, single men spend on average 16 hours on the `Eating', while husbands spend on average 12 hours
per week on the same commodity. On the other hand, wives spend on average 34 hours per week
on `Eating', whereas single women spend only 22 hours. In the case of extended families (more than
one family within the dwelling) it is easy to imagine that these families are dierent from nuclear
families in terms of household expenditures and time uses. It could be the case that families within
the extended household do not pool their incomes. Even in those cases, it is possible that such families
share time uses. For example, a member of one of the families takes care of all the children within
the dwelling, making all other members of the extended household more ecient in their allocation of
time. Because of these dierences we eliminated 1,286 households from the sample. In addition, 500
observations were dropped because only one spouse was present at the time of the survey. Finally,
57 households were removed because they had no income or were missing other variables. The total
number of households in our sample is 2,940.
In Table 3, we summarize the demographic characteristics of husbands and wives as well as their
time uses. In this table and throughout the paper, we dene earnings as all labor earnings, specically,
salaries, wages, overtime payments, and self-employment income.
Based on the summary statistics in Table 3, we know that husbands are on average 4 years older
than wives in the sample. In terms of years of schooling, both spouses are very similar, averaging
about 7 years of education. It is also worth noting that wives' earnings are signicantly lower than
their husbands. This is directly related to the labor force participation decision of both husbands and
18Nuclear households represents 70% of the sample. The other 30% is composed of one-person households (7%) and
extended households (23%).
14Table 3: Demographic Characteristics and Time Uses of Husbands and
Wivesb
Husbands Wives
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Age 42.70 13.66 39.11 12.91
Years of Schooling 6.73 4.92 6.31 4.37
Labor Force Participation .907 .290 .388 .487
Earningsa 928.14 1249.96 207.47 578.21
Firm sizec 50.46 303.09 7.55 66.34
Unionized workerd .074 .262 .028 .165
Time Usese (hrs/week)
Sleep 56.04 16.40 57.81 11.38
Eating 11.68 9.74 33.63 15.78
Lodging 4.15 6.01 16.41 10.18
Appearance 4.36 3.07 13.85 6.95
Health 3.34 5.69 2.77 5.09
Recreation 16.98 14.19 16.04 13.26
Child-care 1.59 6.21 6.32 18.00
Miscellaneous 4.64 9.47 12.90 22.78
Travel .42 1.67 .94 2.30
Work 50.10 24.29 12.14 21.28
a In Mexican pesos as of 2002, per week. We dene earnings as all labor earnings,
specically, salaries, wages, overtime payments, and self-employment income.
b Number of observations: 2,940.
c Firm size refers to the number of workers in the rm where the husband or the
wife works.
d Unionized worker is a indicator variable equal to one if the rm is unionized and
zero otherwise.
e The use of time for each individual does not add up to 168 hours, the total num-
ber of hours in a week, because the ENUT 2002 is based on recall questionnaires
on major activities and not on time use diaries.
15wives. A total of 91 percent of husbands participate in the labor force, whereas only 39 percent of
wives do.
Husbands and wives have dierent time use patterns as a result of specialization. Husbands report
50 hours of work on average, while wives only work, on average, 12 hours a week in a paid job. However,
wives dedicate 34 hours of the week, on average, to `Eating' and 16 hours to `Lodging', while men
spend only 12 and 4 hours, respectively. Also wives dedicate more time to `Appearance', `Child-care'
and `Miscellaneous' commodities than husbands. With respect to `Sleep' and `Recreation', both
husbands and wives devote similar amounts of time, around 56 and 16 hours a week, respectively.
3.3 Time Use and Goods Expenditure
3.3.1 Time Use
In Table 4, we summarize both expenditures and time use of the household.19 We dene household
time use as the sum of the husband's and wife's time use. The household allocates 62 hours for
`Work' a week, on average. A total of 45 hours a week are devoted to `Eating' and 21 hours are
used on `Lodging'. The household sleeps an average of 114 hours a week and 33 hours are used for
`Recreation'per week. Notice that average time spent on `Travel' is about 2 hours per week. This
re
ects that the measure we have for `Travel' time use is poor. The household allocates only 8 hours
per week to `Child-care', on average.20
In principle we could also add the time use of other members of the family to the household
time use. However, most of the other members are children whose opportunity cost of time is not
determined by the labor market. In fact, we could argue that there is no opportunity cost for their
time. Nonetheless, in an attempt to capture any eect children could have on the allocation of goods
or time in the household production of commodities, we control for the number of children in our
estimation.
19For the time use variables the week of reference was the week from Monday to Sunday before the day of the survey.
For the non-time variables the unit of time was daily, monthly, quarterly, or every six months depending on the type of
expenditure. All variables were converted into a weekly basis.
20Around 40% of households do not have children.
16Table 4: Summary Statistics of the Householdsc
Expendituresa Time Useb
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Sleep { { 113.85 22.96
Eating 389.77 321.10 45.31 20.86
Lodging 204.18 270.70 20.56 11.99
Appearance 156.89 187.47 18.21 7.95
Health 36.09 157.79 6.11 9.35
Recreation 104.22 201.23 33.02 23.70
Child-care 124.26 348.85 7.91 22.02
Miscellaneous 62.26 254.83 17.54 29.24
Travel 5.45 54.82 1.36 3.25
Work { { 62.24 33.17
a In Mexican pesos as of 2002, per week.
b The time use of the household is dened as the sum of the time
use of the husband and the wife, per week.
c Number of observations: 2,940.
173.3.2 Market Goods Expenditure
Household expenditures are summarized in Table 4. `Sleep' is assumed to have no expenditures
related to it. Although almost negligible, any expenditures seemingly related to `Sleep' were included
either in `Lodging' or `Appearance'. On average, families in this sample spent 400 pesos per week on
`Eating', 200 pesos per week on `Lodging', 150 pesos per week on `Appearance' and 124 pesos per
week on `Child-care'. These four categories comprise the four largest components of the household
total expenditures.
Households can hire workers such as maids, nannies, or drivers to produce household commodities.
The employees carry out activities that are included in `Eating', `Lodging', `Appearance', `Travel'
or `Child-care' commodities. Therefore, we include the monetary payments the workers receive
as household good expenditures because they represent market goods used to produce household
commodities. However, we do not observe the salary these employees actually receive for their services,
so we use the hourly minimum wage21 to construct the market value of their hours of work. For
example, if the employee dedicated 10 hours a week to the production of the `eating' commodity and
25 hours to the `Lodging' commodity then we include 10*minimum wage in the `Eating' expenditure
category and 25*minimum wage in the `Lodging' expenditure category.
4 Estimation
In this section we report our estimates of the elasticities of substitution between time and market goods
for four commodities. We are not aware of other research that attempts to estimate the particular
elasticity of substitution between time and market goods. Nevertheless, there is a large number of
econometric studies that estimate the elasticity of substitution between labor and capital. For a
summary of such estimates see Berndt (1976) and Caddy (1976). Both of these authors mentioned
that there is a substantial disagreement over the value of the elasticity of substitution due to the
apparent sensitivity of the estimates to the database used, the choice of functional form, and the
estimating technique.22 Much closer to what we do in here are the estimates by Rupert et al. (1994) of
the elasticity of substitution between market and home consumption goods. Using the Panel Study of
21The average minimum wage in Mexico for 2002 was 4.96 pesos per hour.
22For recent estimates of the elasticity of substitution between labor and capital see Antras (2004).
18Income Dynamics, they estimated such elasticity for single males, single females and married couples.
The results indicate that for single females and married couples there is high substitution elasticity
between market and home consumption goods.
We estimate the elasticity of substitution for the `Eating', `Lodging', `Appearance', and `Recreation'
commodities. `Health' and `Travel' are not included in the estimation because, as explained in Section
3.1, we have poor measures of time use for these categories. We also ignore `Child-care'. Signicant
proportion of families do not have children, and for most families with children, child-care is most prob-
ably a secondary activity. That is, parents take care of their children under 13 while doing something
else as the main activity.
4.1 Estimation Specication
Assuming the household production function for commodity j is CES, the relative demand function
for the ratio of market goods expenditure Yj, dened as pjXj, and time expenditure Tj is:
ln(Yj=Tj) = constant + jln(jwm + (1   j)wf) (6)
where wm and wf are the wage rate of the husband and wife respectively, j is the weight on the
husband's price of time, and j is the elasticity of substitution between market goods and time.23
We use nonlinear least squares to estimate equation (6). The resulting parameter estimates for
`Eating', `Lodging', `Appearance' and `Recreation' are reported in Table 5. The control variables
included when estimating equation (6) are an urban dummy, state dummies, number of children less
than 12 years old, number of daughters over 12 years old, and number of sons over 12 years old. Our
main interest centers on the estimates of the elasticity of substitution, ^ .
Once we control for other characteristics of the household, we nd that `Eating' has the lowest
elasticity of substitution between market goods and time. This is very intuitive given that food can not
be substituted with anything else, not even time. Also, the most important activity in this commodity
is actually eating which is very time intensive and, in contrast to other activities like meal preparation
or dish washing, cannot be paid to be done by someone else.
`Lodging' has the second lowest elasticity of substitution. In the city, activities such as house-
cleaning, outdoor chores, and home repairs are very easy to buy in the market by paying someone to
23The coecient j is dened as 1=(1   j) where j is the parameter of the CES function for commodity j.
19Table 5: NLLS Equation by Equationa, b
N constant ^  ^ 
Eating 2727 -.273 .344 .327
(.114) (.015) (.031)
Lodging 2738 -.620 .447 .283
(.148) (.019) (.027)
Appearance 2733 -.852 .462 .289
(.138) (.018) (.025)
Recreation 2367 -2.691 .573 .359
(.222) (.029) (.036)
a Standard errors in parenthesis.
b ^  is the weight on the husband's price of time, and ^  is
the elasticity of substitution between market goods and
time. N refers to the number of observations used in
each estimation. Control variables are urban dummy,
state dummies, number of children less than 12 years
old, number of daughters over 12 years old and number
of sons over 12 years old.
20do such works for you. However, in rural areas this substitution between the household's time and
the corresponding market goods is very rare, and these activities are in most cases performed by the
members of the household. Once we consider this dierence, `Lodging' has a very low elasticity of
substitution. In the Mexican case, the majority of these activities are responsibility of the wife and
such activities absorb most of her time.
`Appearance' has the next to largest estimate of the elasticity of substitution between market
goods and time. Although it is true that activities such as personal hygiene are very time-intensive,
you can certainly spend a lot of money, relative to time, on such activities. Also, activities like laundry
and clothes care could be done in various ways that range from the very time-intensive to the very
goods-intensive.
Finally, `Recreation' has the highest elasticity of substitution. It is not dicult to nd examples
of recreational activities in which the substitution between market goods and time is very easy. More-
over, this commodity includes very time-intensive activities such as reading, writing, conversing and
thinking, as well as very market-good intensive activities such as social events, sports or some hobbies.
Given that j does not play any role in our analysis we can simplify our estimation by writing
equation (6) as:
ln(Yj=Tj) = constant + jln(wageHH) (7)
where wageHH is the sum of the husband's and wife's wage rates.
The benet of this simplication is that equation (7) is now linear. In Table 6 we compare estimates
of the elasticity of substitution for `Eating', `Lodging', `Appearance', and `Recreation' using equations
(6) and (7). Comparing OLS and NLLS columns, we conclude there is no statistically signicant
dierence in the estimates of  regardless of whether we use equation (6) or (7).
By dening wageHH as the sum of the wages of the spouses, we are implicitly assuming that the
wages of the husband and wife have the same weight. However, estimates of j using non-linear least
squares are signicantly dierent from 0.5. Thus to check whether implicitly assuming equal weights
makes a dierence in the estimates of j we estimate the following equation:
ln(Yj=Tj) = constant + jln( ^ jwm + (1   ^ j)wf) (8)
where ^ j comes from the estimates of j in Table 5. When comparing the estimates of the elasticities
from this equation with the OLS estimates from equation (7), it turns out that the estimates of the
21Table 6: OLS and NLLS Equation by
Equationa, b
N OLS NLLS
Eating 2727 .345 .344
(.015) (.015)
Lodging 2738 .449 .447
(.019) (.019)
Appearance 2733 .465 .462
(.018) (.018)
Recreation 2367 .576 .573
(.029) (.029)
a Standard errors in parenthesis.
b Estimates in this table refer to ^ , the
elasticity of substitution between market
goods and time. Control variables are ur-
ban dummy, state dummies, number of
children less than 12 years old, number of
daughters over 12 years old and number
of sons over 12 years old.
22elasticities under equation (8) are very similar to the estimates under equation (7).24 Hence, assuming
equal weights or using the optimal weights from equation (6) makes little dierence in the estimates of
the elasticities of substitution between market goods and time. Therefore, the remainder of the study
will use the estimation based on equation (7).
To test whether the coecients are the same across commodity equations we estimate the four
commodity equations as a system.25 We test and reject the hypothesis that all coecients are equal
using a Wald test. We also test the same hypothesis and reject the null for all dierent pairs of
coecients, except for the case when we compare `Lodging' and `Appearance' commodities.
4.2 Instrumental Variables Estimation
We suspect wageHH is endogenous in equation (7). There are unobservable characteristics, such as
diligence or attitude toward planning, that are highly valued both in the labor market and in home
production. Therefore, households which are ecient at home production are usually also ecient
in the labor market, which translates into higher salaries. Without correcting the omitted variables
problem the estimates of the elasticity of substitution will be inconsistent. To obtain consistent
estimates of the elasticity we need instruments, variables correlated with family labor earnings but
not directly with household production.
The set of instruments for the household labor earnings that we are using are: whether the rm
in which the husband works is unionized and the size of the rm in which the husband and the wife
are employed (measured by the number of workers). All our instruments are valid. The union dummy
and size of the rm variables are clearly not related to the household decision of how much market
goods and how much time to use in the production of a certain commodity, but certainly explain a
lot of the wages of the husband and the wife, and therefore the household earnings. The prices that
households pay for the market goods (implicit in the dependent variable) are clearly not correlated
with our instrumental variables. Such prices are taken as given by the household and are not in
uenced
by whether the spouse is a unionized worker or not, or whether he or his wife works in a big or a small
company.
To test whether the coecients are signicantly dierent across the four commodities we estimate
24Estimates are available upon request.
25Estimates of the system of equations using SUR and the values of all Wald tests are available upon request.
23a system of equations using GMM. We estimate system GMM using the set of instruments described
above. For the rst iteration, we used the estimates from GMM equation by equation. The system
includes the household labor earnings equation as well as the four commodity equations. The regressors
in the household labor earnings equation are years of education of both spouses, age and age squared
of both spouses, rm size for both spouses, and a union dummy for the husband. Estimates of the
elasticities of substitution are in Table 7. All coecients in the table are signicantly dierent from
zero.
Table 7: System GMM with Four Commodities:
Elasticity of Substitutiona
Eating Lodging Appearance Recreation
.343 .526 .576 .742
(.085) (.099) (.086) (.117)
a Standard errors in parenthesis. Estimates in this ta-
ble refer to ^ , the elasticity of substitution between
market goods and time. Control variables are urban
dummy, state dummies, number of children less than
12 years old, number of daughters over 12 years old
and number of sons over 12 years old. N=2,354.
Similar to the previous estimates, it is the case that `Eating' has the lowest elasticity of substitution
and `Recreation' has the highest elasticity of substitution. In between we have `Lodging' and
`Appearance', in that order.
One important dierence between the estimates in Table 6, without taking care of the endogeneity
problem, and the estimates in Table 7, when the endogeneity problem is appropriately solved, is the
value of the estimates. For all commodities except `Eating', the elasticities of substitution between
market goods and time are higher. This suggests that estimation without controlling for possible
endogeneity problem is likely to underestimate the true eect of household earnings on the decision
between market goods and time.
Using the results in Table 7 we test the hypothesis that the four elasticities of substitution are
24Table 8: Wald Tests for System GMM Results
Hypothesis P-Values
^ Eating = ^ Lodging = ^ Appearance = ^ Recreation 0.016
^ Lodging = ^ Appearance = ^ Recreation 0.305
^ Eating = ^ Lodging 0.091
^ Eating = ^ Appearance 0.022
^ Eating = ^ Recreation 0.002
^ Lodging = ^ Appearance 0.639
^ Lodging = ^ Recreation 0.131
^ Appearance = ^ Recreation 0.204
equal. P-Values of the corresponding Wald tests are reported in Table 8. In the rst row we test the
hypothesis that all elasticities are the same and we reject it. However, according to the second row,
we cannot reject the null that the elasticities for `Lodging' , `Appearance', and `Recreation' are the
same. This result is supported by the corresponding p-values in the last three rows where we test the
hypothesis that each pair of these commodities' elasticities are the same.
For this reason, we calculated the elasticities of substitution using system GMM with instrumental
variables for the commodities dened as `Eating', and the composite commodity `Lodging-Appearance-
Recreation'. The results are in Table 9.
Based on Table 9, it is again the case that the `Eating' elasticity of substitution is the smallest.
These results are used to analyze the policy implications of our theoretical model. The elasticity of
substitution for `Eating' is 0.440 and 0.681 for `Lodging-Appearance-Recreation'.
5 Policy Implications
The dierences in the goods-time substitution of each commodity suggest the importance of setting
dierential goods taxes. This section calculates the optimal goods taxes in Mexico. Based on the results
in Table 8, we denote Z0, Z1, and Z2 as `Sleeping', `Eating', and `Lodging-Appearance-Recreation'.
Table 4 shows that Mexican households spend on average 389.77 pesos and 465.29 pesos on Z1 and Z2,
25Table 9: System GMM with Two Commodities:
Elasticity of Substitutiona
Eating Lodging + Appearance + Recreation
.440 .681
(.029) (.028)
a Standard errors in parenthesis. Estimates in this table
refer to ^ , the elasticity of substitution between market
goods and time. Control variables are urban dummy,
state dummies,number of children less than 12 years
old, number of daughters over 12 years old and number
of sons over 12 years old. N = 2,354.
respectively. They also spend 113.87 hours a week on T0, 45.33 hours on T1, and 71.80 hours on T2,
and they work 62.18 hours per week. In addition, the elasticities of substitution between goods and
time for Z1 and Z2 are 0.440 and 0.681 in that order. We assume these observed goods expenditures
and time use patterns are the outcome of the optimal choice made by Mexican consumers under the
current tax system in Mexico. We simplify the actual Mexican tax system by setting tax rates on Z1
equal to 0% and Z2 equal to 15%.26
For policy analysis we use the same log-utility function in equation (5). We have to recover values
for the underlying parameters from our data set. Note that we need values for the following 10
parameters: 1, 2, w, T, p1, p2, 0, 1, 2, and M. The system GMM estimation in Table 9 gives the
values for 1 and 2. We set w = T = 1.27 From the solution of the utility optimization problem we





2. Then we have six equations28 and six parameters. Solving the
system, we get p1 = 0:24, p2 = 0:44, 0 = 0:19, 1 = 0:31, 2 = 0:49, and M = 0:97.29
26In reality, appliances and eating outside are taxed, but the expenditures on these goods are small.
27Think of p1 and p2 as the prices of goods relative to the wage rate. Tj for j=0,1,2 is the ratio of hours to the total
time spending, that is T0 = 38:8%, T1 = 17:8%, T2 = 18:4%, and L = 25:0%.
28Five equations from the solution of utility optimization problem and one equation from the parameter restriction;
0 + 1 + 2 = 1. For detailed solutions to this system of equations, please refer to Technical Appendix A.3
29We used the fsolve function built in MATLAB to solve the six equations simultaneously. The initial vector is [p1
p2 0 1 2 M] = [1 1 0:33 0:33 0:33 1].
26Table 10: Optimal Tax Ratea
Current(A) Optimal(B) (B)   (A)
Tax rate Eating 0.0% 7.0%
Lodging + Appearance + Recreation 15.0% 5.5%
Expenditurea Eating 389.77 288.76 -101.01
Lodging + Appearance + Recreation 465.29 599.39 134.10
Time spendingb Sleeping 113.87 113.87
Eating 45.33 52.22 6.89
Lodging + Appearance + Recreation 71.80 53.80 -18.00
Work 62.18 73.30 11.11
a Mexican pesos.
b Hours per week.
Now we have all the values we need to calculate the optimal tax rates. From the 10;201
 
= 1012
possible tax rate combinations (s1;s2),30 we pick all combinations that give the government the same
revenue as in the current tax system. For each of these combinations we calculate the corresponding
indirect utility value V (s1;s2). The pair (7:0%, 5:5%) gives the highest possible indirect utility,
therefore this vector is the optimal tax combination.
Table 10 shows the household's behavior under the optimal tax system. Under the optimal tax
rates, our model predicts Mexican household spends 288.76 pesos and 52.22 hours on Z1 weekly on
average. They also spend 599.39 pesos and use 53.80 hours on Z2 a week on average. They work 73.30
hours a week. Compared with the current tax rates, the optimal tax system requires government to
increase the tax rate on Z1 by 7 percentage points (from 0% to 7.0%) and reduce the tax rate on Z2
by 9.5 percentage points (from 15% to 5.5%).
6 Conclusions
We relax the usual assumption that individuals get utility directly from market goods. Instead,
following Becker (1965), we assume that individuals combine market goods and time to produce
commodities which ultimately yield utility. Previous research has incorporated Becker's idea that
goods have to be combined with time to yield utility, but it simplies the analysis by assuming a
Leontief commodity production function. Thus, our contribution consists of allowing substitution
30For each sj 2 f0:000;0:005;0:010;:::;0:490;0:495;0:500g for j=1,2.
27between market goods and time in the production of commodities by assuming a CES commodity
production function. By incorporating these assumptions into the Ramsey optimal tax problem we
show it is optimal to impose lower taxes on goods used in the production of commodities with a higher
elasticity of substitution because these goods are easily substitutable for time. Likewise, goods used to
produce a commodity in which it is dicult to substitute away from market goods toward time should
be taxed at a higher rate. The goal is to minimize the distortionary eects of taxes over household
utility maximization. This is an analog of the classical Corlett and Hague (1953-1954) result, diering
in that we allow for substitution between time and goods expenditures.
Using the Mexican time use data set from 2002, we estimate the elasticity of substitution between
goods expenditures and time in the production of four dierent commodities: `Eating', `Lodging',
`Appearance', and `Recreation'. For these four commodities, we nd that the elasticity is signicantly
dierent from zero and `Eating' has a signicantly dierent elasticity from `Lodging', `Appearance',
and `Recreation'. The elasticity of substitution for `Recreation' is highest. However, we cannot reject
the hypothesis that the elasticity of substitution for `Lodging' is equal to the elasticity of substitution
for `Appearance' and `Recreation'.
Combining these estimates of the elasticity of substitution with our theoretical results, we conclude
that higher taxes should be imposed on the market goods, like food, used in the production of `Eating'.
Along the same lines, lower taxes should be imposed on the market goods used in the production of
`Lodging', `Appearance', and `Recreation'. The optimal tax structure is regressive, it goes against the
common practice of exempting necessities such as food from sales tax bases. Comparing this optimal
tax system to the actual one, we can argue that the Mexican government has traded o eciency
for equity. The actual system in Mexico has a zero tax rate on food and a 15 percent value added
tax on all other goods except medicines. Households are very heterogeneous in their earning ability,
so by exempting food the government may be attempting to make sales taxes less regressive. This
regressivity suggests that future research needs to address the eciency-equity trade-o of commodity
taxation.
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30Appendix
A. Derivations of Theoretical Model
A.1 Household Utility Maximization Problem
A.1.1 Step One
Given  Zj;qj; and w;
min
Xj;Tj













































































and equation (9), we have:
Xj = j  Zj (10)



























such that q1X1 + ::: + qnXn = w(T   T1   :::   Tn   T0) + M
We can rewrite the budget constraint by using (10) and (11).
q1X1 + ::: + qnXn = w(T   T1   :::   Tn   T0) + M

0Z0 + 
1Z1 + ::: + 










So the maximization problem is:
max
Z0;Z1;;Zn
U (Z0;Z1; ;Zn) such that 
0Z0 + 
1Z1 + ::: + 
nZn = wT + M:
Then solutions are Uj = 
j for j = 0;1;::;n where  is the lagrangian multiplier.
A.2 Optimal Government Policy Problem
A.2.1 Optimal Government Policy Problem
The Government problem is
max
s1;:::;sn
V (q0;q1; ;qn;w) such that s1X1 +  + snXn =  R:
The lagrangian is:
L = V (q0;q1; ;qn;w) + (s1X1 +  + snXn   R)



















A = 0 for k = 1;:::;n:



























































































To derive the property of compensated elasticity, we dierentiate  U = U (T0;X1;T1;X2;T2) with















































































2Z2 s:t  U = 0 lnZ0 + 1 lnZ1 + 2 lnZ2
Then we can obtain the following compensated demand function for X1 and X2:
Xc

















































































































































































This does not immediately translate into 1 < 2 ! "c
10 < "c
20. However this result always holds if the
price of the necessity (q1) is lower than the price of the luxury (q2). Even if the price of the necessity
is higher than the price of the luxury, the result holds as long as the elasticity of substitution of Z2
is suciently larger than that of Z1. Conventional wisdom contends that a necessity tends to have
33a lower elasticity of substitution than a luxury. As shown empirically in Section 4, the elasticity of
substitution for a necessity is signicantly lower than that of a luxury.
A.3 Policy Implication



































w if i = 0
qjj + wj if i = 1;2:
A.3.2 Six Equations and Six Unknown Parameters
We solved 6 equations simultaneously to get values of 6 unknown parameters. The six unknown pa-
rameters are p1;p2;0;1;2;M, and the six equations are: T
0 = 0:389, T






















+ M. Solving the system,
we get p1 = 0:2493, p2 = 0:4489, 0 = 0:1962, 1 = 0:3103, 2 = 0:4936, and M = 0:9797.
34